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The story of the Contract Buyers League, unfinished 
though it is, presents a model of social change that com-
bines familiar techniques in an unusual and extremely 
powerful way. Rather than contributing to only one 
phase of social evolution, the Gamaliel Foundation 
workers have pursued their project through several 
stages, directly participating in each one. 
The workers began with a so-called "listening 
process," isolating the problem they would ""att~ck from 
the everyday impressions and experiences shared by the 
black people in whose ghetto neighborhood they lived. 
Next, they immersed themselves in Nader-like con-
sumer research, measuring the exploitation in dollars and 
cents, and identifying the exploiters by names and 
addresses, thereby transforming gut feelings into a docu-
mented pattern. At this point, they cQuld have merely 
turned over their findings to the mass media where the 
impact would be dissipated when the intense but short-
lived attention of the press was played out. Instead, 
they organized a series of small meetings with the black 
homebuyers and showed to each the details behind his 
contract and how his neighbors were in a similar 
predicament. 
The findings were withheld from the mass media out 
of fear that their impact would be dissipated when the 
intense but short-lived attention of the press was played 
out. 
This use of information laid a natural basis for the 
next stage, a Saul Alinsky-type of organization for 
power. The workers realized that the power of the 
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buyers' group would best be exercised in accord with a 
prineiple of "independent interaction." This principle 
implied mobilizing legal, financial, political, religious 
and journalistic institutions by direct pleas, pressure if 
necessary, brought to bear by the organization itself. 
They hoped thereby to avoid the dangers of dilution, 
distraction and co-optation inherent in alliance with 
other existing groups. 
Finally, by emphasizing the opportunities for contin-
uous education, both for the workers, many of whom 
were students, and for the ghetto residents themselves, 
the whole project was cast in the light of a mutual 
learning experience. 
The most astonishing thing about the Contract Buyers 
League story is that this particular problem of housing, 
race and poverty has never before been fully recognized. 
The issue of racial discrimination has usually been seen 
as one of how to get blacks admitted into white areas or 
how to prevent "panic peddling" and "blockbusting" so 
that property values will be protected. Rarely have the 
specially oppressive contracts imposed upon blacks be-
cause of their captive market position been viewed as 
discrimination. The problem of ghetto housing has popu-
larly been seen only as a matter of constructing new 
public projects, enforcing building codes, or strengthen-
ing tenants' rights. The issue of the frustration of the 
desire of black citizens to own and maintain their own 
homes by unconscionable profiteering has been com-
pletely overlooked. When we consider that housing 
takes a tremendous share of the ghetto dweller's budget 1
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and that the ghetto's conscientious homeowners, not 
prone to militance, are its best hope for self-improve-
ment, the oversight is even more astonishing. Home 
purchase exploitation deserves as well as any other issue 
to be called the most critical problem facing our black 
population. 
The singular success of the Gamaliel Foundation 
workers in focusing on this problem and pursuing it with 
relentless, undistracted devotion is primarily due to their 
continued adherence to a sincere, open listening attitude 
toward the people they are serving. Their basic faith is 
that there can be distilled from the values perceived and 
shared by the people themselves not only an identifica-
tion of the problem, but the best eventual resolution and 
the appropriate means to that end as well. In the fact of 
too-long unchallenged established values based on 
economic assumptions irrelevant to a ghetto market, the 
workers believe that laymen's thoughts about what is 
fair, reasonable, right and just are entitled to as much 
respect as the judgment of "professionals" and may be 
ethically more satisfying and perhaps eminently more 
practical. 
Their faith belies an issue which has important impli-
cations for the legal profession. That issue explains the 
CBL's inability to achieve much short-range success and 
implies that long-range success may be forever beyond 
its grasp. Despite the CBL's efforts to adhere to the 
common sense notions of natural justice held by its 
members, the League found that when it had to take its 
problems to attorneys and judges, these men didn't 
listen very well. The conflict between the Contract 
Buyers League and the judicial process may be attributed 
to the irreconcilability of a movement based on "people 
power" and an institution based on abstracted rules. Yet 
this tension could be reduced a great deal if the legal 
system would realize that it is rooted anthropologically 
in human values and, therefore, ought to constantly re-
new contact with those values. 
A classic example of loss of contact between the legal 
profession and an injustice as perceived is presented by 
the story of the federal class action now moving toward 
trial. Once the problem of contract buying had been 
researched and the buyers had organized, they went to 
some thirty lawyers, including several in the law firm 
that finally filed the federal suit, to see whether the law 
could remedy such an injustice. None of the lawyers 
could suggest a cause of action. It was not until hundreds 
of contract buyers were in deep trouble from the first 
rent withholding and about to lose their homes that the 
lawyers seriously attempted to translate the contract 
buyers' exploitation into a legally cognizable wrong. The 
first fact of life which confronted the lawyers when the 
buyers returned to them, summonses in hand, was 
merely procedural: the swift summary action of the 
forcible entry and detainer proceedings in Cook County 
Circuit Court had to be stopped, either by raising a 
defense in the eviction suits or by going into a state 
court of equity or a federal district court to obtain an 
injunction against continuance of the county circuit 
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court actions. The top talent of Jenner, Block and 
McCoy, Ming and Black decided on an affirmative suit 
against the contract sellers in federal court on behalf of 
all contract buyers in the city of Chicago as a class. 
Overnight they threw every fact of possible relevance to 
the contract buyer's misery into a complaint whose 
factual allegations ran forty pages. They listed, as laws 
which might be violated, a raft of old Federal Recon-
struction Civil Rights Statutes, the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act, Illinois commercial laws on usury, unconscion-
ability, and warranties, and even federal securities 
statutes. Under pressure, they had listened to the whole 
story the black homebuyers had to tell. They were then 
able to lay out the facts beside _a broac;I field of possibly 
relevant laws. 
As it turned uut, the federal suit was of almost no use 
in staying evictions, but it did provide some hope that 
the law would see in the contract buyers' situation an 
injustice which it would correct. However, !udge ~ill, in 
upholding the civil rights claim over a motion to dis-
miss seemed to seize only upon certain aspects of the 
com~laint. The CBL lawyers had translated their clients' 
entire story into legally cognizable terms, yet Judge Will 
altered this by the language of his opinion when he 
attempted to fit these problems into traditional defini-
tions of racial discrimination. The way he saw it, the 
core of the problem was that the sellers had charged 
blacks higher prices than they would have charged 
whites. 
It can be demonstrated by rather simple economic 
analysis that to cast seller behavior this way involves the 
wholly mistaken assumption that realtors would sell at 
lower price to a white than to a black of similar purchas-
ing qualifications. This the buyers would have to prove 
in court. Thus, Judge Will may have characterized the 
buyers' claim in such a way that it will be impossible for 
them to prove their case at trial. Even if the buyers get 
that far, there is the danger that on appeal the Seventh 
Circuit or the Supreme Court may reverse, holding that 
though the .facts were proved in accordance with Judge 
Will's description of the cause of action, Judge Will failed 
in his attempt to fit the claim within discrimination as 
traditionally defined. 
If Judge Will had listened more openly to the main 
theme of the CBL complaint, that of racial exploitation, 
he might have shaped the cause of action so that it 
would correspond to the injustice as the buyers actually 
felt it. Their sense of exploitation can be stated in a 
legally cognizable way: the sellers, knowing the buyers 
were the victims of a racially segmented housing market, 
took advantage of the blacks' lack of bargaining power 
to make large profits and to maintain in the sellers' 
hands an inordinate advantage in contractual conditions 
and privileges. Such an understanding would be more 
appropriate to the kind.of case the buyers could realisti-
cally hope to present at trial. Since it is based on a 
broader analysis of how all market participants on the 
supply side injure blacks, rather than on the narrow 
traditional definition of white-black discrimination, the 
notion of racial exploitation might be received more 
favorably by appellate courts because it shows more 
clearly the distinctive racial features of this particular 
contract selling phenomenon. 
Just as the thirty lawyers originally saw nothing 
legally actionable in the CBL srory, Judge Will approach-
ed the facts with the preconceptions of his legal training 
and experience. Although he referred to "exploitation" 
and "advantage-taking" in his opinion, when he came 
down to identifying what precisely was illegal he mis-
takenly fell back on a traditional notion of discrimina-
tion: that one's treatment of blacks must be compared 
with his treatment ofwhites. Thus, he gave the buyers a 
tenuous basis for relief. 
The legal institution, which is really no more than the 
people who keep its gates and who apply their learned 
reason to citizens who gain entrance, was not able to 
listen to the problem like the Gamaliel Foundation . 
workers who had first begun livmg in the ghetfo. Largely 
because of this disparity in "listening" ability, the CBL 
movement for social change and the legal institution 
with which it must interact have experienced and will 
continue to encounter varying degrees of misunder-
standing and discord. 
Another instance of the gulf between the legal institu-
tion and basic notions of justice can be cited in the way 
the circuit courts of Cook County handled the eviction 
suits arising from the holdouts. At the time of the 
second big CBL holdout, the circuit courts had gained 
the reputation of "eviction mills". A Chicago newspaper 
uncovered the story of one judge who, in the midst of 
churning out dozens of eviction orders per hour, left his 
bench for a few minutes and let his clerk carry on with 
the docket. CBL "holdout" families received similarly 
cursory treatment, even though they each attempted to 
raise in their defense the allegations of the entire federal 
lawsuit. The judges told the people their hands were tied 
by statute, but to the buyers it seemed rather a case of 
judicial hands washed after the fashion of Pilate. Fre-
quently heard at CBL meetings were anguished tales of 
eviction proceedings that showed how far the courts had 
actually fallen below the peoples' expectations of 
American justice. Buyers told how they were not 
permitted to speak except to say whether or not they 
had received the default notice and paid in full. If a jury 
was demanded, the judge would either take the question 
away from the jury or "tell them how to vote." The 
buyers were more than disappointed; such treatment 
made them feel that economic weapons were their only 
hope for justice, thus fanning the flames of the holdout 
and bringing them into further conflict with the courts. 
All the contract buyers' frustration with this proce-
dure could be dismissed as naive were it not for the fact 
that when a few eviction defendants who had posted the 
requisite appeal bond reached the Illinois Supreme Court 
many months later, the Illinois justices held that the 
forcible statute did allow the contract buyers' defenses. 
In other words, if a county circuit judge had permitted 
the defenses to be raised, his discretion would have been 
upheld. If just one judge had done that, the CBL lawyers 
would suddenly have had the opportunity to go down 
the street and prove their federal civil rights case in state 
court. Aside from the impetus this might have given the 
trial discovery process, it would have made it imperative 
that the question of interim contract payments be 
settled in a way acceptable to both fede1al and state 
courts. In the final analysis, the lesson of the eviction 
3
: The Contract Buyers League
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1971
defense story is that when a particular procedure is so 
much at odds with what a citizen conceives to be his 
"day in court," judges, especia!Iy judges with the lowest 
general and original jurisdiction, must listen carefully 
and be ready to respond when certain basic values are 
presented more strongly than ever before. 
As a final and perhaps most telling example of how 
legal institutions can benefit from a sincere listening 
process, there is the issue of how the economic relation-
ship of buyers and sellers is to be structured during the 
period before final judgment on the merits of each 
party's position is reached. The most important problem 
faced by the CBL members, their lawyers and backers, 
by the courts and other mediators, and by their oppo-
nents has very simply been the question of money. 
The contract sellers' point of view is that the fact of 
litigation should not be allowed to disturb the monthly 
obligation of their buyers to make installment payments 
to them. The law, viewing contracts with an approach 
cognate to the presumption of innocence, almost always 
agrees. 
For this money flow to be cut off by a payment 
strike means that the whole buyer-seller economy is 
thrown out of order. Sellers cannot meet monthly 
mortgage, tax and insurance costs for which they had 
relied on a revenue stream from the buyers. Buyers get 
to live in their homes for free. And if the reason for the 
strike turns out not to be legally valid, the money owed 
the sellers may have been irretrievably dispersed. 
The contract buyers' point of view has never been as 
extreme as the sellers visualize it. Their desire not to pay 
the sellers has been tempered by a feeling of justice 
which takes into account, to some degree, what the seller 
is entitled to expect. First of all, the CBL members have 
conscientiously felt that it would not be right for them 
to live in their houses for free. Their holdout system, 
making out money orders to themselves in the amount 
of their regular monthly payments and depositing them 
with the League was a pledge of honor buttressed by the 
penalty of denial of CBL-retained legal assistance to 
those who did not keep their deposits current. Further-
more, the central depositing procedure was a sort of 
guarantee that the funds would not be lost. 
The reasonableness of the buyers' position and their 
willingness to compromise is evident from the numerous 
proposals they made to federal and s~ate judges for 
depositing the monthly payments in the hands of the 
court. In fact, they often characterized their money 
order procedure as the best they could do since the 
courts would not set up an escrow fund. The buyers' 
proposals included authorizing the court to make dis-
bursements out of the fund for the sellers' mortgage 
costs, taxes, insurance and even operational overhead. 
Yet not the slightest degree of acceptance was indicated 
by any of the courts involved in the conflict. 
The stance of the state courts was firmly dictated by 
the appeal bond provisions of the forcible statute. Within 
five days after a judgment of eviction, the defendant had 
to supply a lump-sum cash bond equal to the amount of 
the default, plus the monthly payments which would be 
due during the pendancy of the appeal. Thus, most 
appeal bonds were fixed in the three to four thousand 
dollar range, on the assumption that the appeal would 
take at least a year. Despite offers by CBL to post 
securities lent by their backers or to pay the bonds them-
selves in monthly installments, the courts did not budge. 
On two occasions it appeared that the sellers would 
have to make some concessions on the money issue. 
Judge Will's order of April 3, 1969, contemplated the 
resumption of payment by striking CBL members and 
the deposit by defendant sellers with a court-appointed 
trustee of one-half of their profits as security for the 
plaintiff-buyers. And a year later, Mayor Daley's attempt 
at mediation of large-scale evictions involved the posting 
of a $100,000 bond, form unspecified, by a certain new 
home seller. However, these proposals gained little favor 
from the contract buyers, for direct payments to the 
sellers were still required. 
In actuality, the most compromising buyer proposal 
and the most generous schemes of Judge Will and Mayor 
Daley differed by only a few dollars per month per 
contract. The crucial difference was to whom the pay-
ments had to be made. The buyers could ni:ver tolerate 
direct payment to the sellers, for, as Judge Will himself 
recognized, since the buyers believed they were being 
exploited and had received some legal support for this 
belief, each payment was a "continuing indignity." Why 
didn't the courts really listen to what concerned the 
buyers most? It would have been a small thing to 
indulge the buyers' preference, since the revenue flow, 
once the arrangement had been set up, was virtually the 
same. When one looks at the courts' frequent use of 
receivers for tenants' complaints against their landlords 
for lack of housing code adherence, it is amazing that no 
judge in the CBL controversy took a similar step. 
Instead, the legal institution was deaf to the most 
reasonable requests by the buyers for a judicially. 
approved escrow fund. All the suffering which ensued 
was an U!"Jnecessary sacrifice to the sanctity of the seller's 
personal right to collect. It was bad enough that lawyers 
misunderstood and for a long while could not even 
begin to comprehend the black homebuyers' exploita-
tion claim. It was bad enough that the county circuit 
judges would not hear valid defenses to eviction suits. 
Few judges knowingly take on the risk of reversal. But 
the worst listening problem occurred when the courts 
clung to the unexamined assumption that the sellers' 
right to direct payment was untouchable and closed their 
ears to black people who were crying out that their fight 
against the human indignity of direct tribute to racial 
exploiters was worth staking everything they had. 
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